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ABSTRACT

Equal Employment Opportunity laws are a relatively new construct within the framework
of American legal history. This area of law, however, has experienced significant development
within a relatively short span of time. Over the last half-century, the Supreme Court of the
United States has handed down several landmark decisions, clarifying the law as to what
constitutes sexual harassment, and in which circumstances employers can be held liable for the
harassing actions of employees.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine this development, and to assess the question of
whether the awards given to male victims of workplace sexual harassment are comparable to the
awards given to female victims.
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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) was one of the first federal laws
that was passed to protect private sector employees from employment discrimination. Among
many other things, this law has been interpreted to protect employees from sexual harassment in
the workplace. It also forbids employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion. The law forbids harassment based on these classifications as
well as making employment decisions based on these. Title VII was an empowering piece of
legislation to the civil rights movement because it provided protection for these classes.
As a part of this law, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) was
created in order to evaluate, process, and resolve claims of employment discrimination. In order
for an individual to seek redress for an act of employment discrimination, he or she must first file
a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC then investigates the claim, and offers a ruling on it. If
the EEOC chooses not to resolve the claim, it offers a “Right to Sue” letter which authorize the
complainant to file an action in federal court.

The United States Supreme Court and the EEOC have distinguished between two types
of workplace sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.1 Both types of
sexual harassment have been determined to be violations of Title VII. This thesis will focus
primarily on the latter.

1

See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson (citation to follow)
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The first part of this thesis will contain a literature review that examines themes such as
the history of the inclusion of “sex” as a protected class in Title VII, gender attitudes, and
attitudes toward sexual harassment. The next part will briefly summarize the development of
case law within the United States Supreme Court pertaining to hostile work environment sexual
harassment, examining themes such as the standards used to address whether a supervisor’s
conduct should be considered harassing, the standard used to address an employer’s vicarious
liability for the harassing actions of a supervisor, as well as the different types of damages
available as redress in certain scenarios. This section will examine not only the advances in
workplace sexual harassment law, but also the limitations on workers’ rights that have been
created through the court system. The last substantial part of this thesis will revolve around a
survey that was developed by Anthony Ferraro and myself for the purposes of this research. The
purpose of the survey is, in short, to determine the relationship between a potential juror’s gender
attitudes, attitudes toward sexual harassment, and the gender of a victim of sexual harassment in
a hypothetical hostile work environment sexual harassment scenario, and to explore whether
these things have an effect on award amounts that the victim would receive.

This research is necessary because there has been no substantial investigation into the
effect that the victim’s gender in a sexual harassment scenario has on jury award amounts.
Although there has been some research into the effect that the jury member’s own gender has on
award amounts in the case of a female victim, this facet of sexual harassment litigation has not
been adequately addressed.

2

BACKGROUND
In order for one to grasp the significance of the changes in workplace sexual harassment
law, I believe that it is necessary to have an understanding of the political climate in which Title
VII was passed. 1964, the year that the Civil Rights Act was passed, was directly in the midst of
the Civil Rights Movement, the Feminist Movement, and the beginning stages of the Anti-War
Movement. The political atmosphere was ripe with discontent, and people were mobilizing to do
something about it.

Originally, when Title VII was proposed to Congress, there were only four protected
classes: race, color, national origin, and religion. Sex was not added as a protected class until an
amendment to the bill, including sex, was proposed by a southern Democrat Representative
named Howard Smith on February 8th, 1964.2 This amendment, which simply added the work
“sex” to the protected classes section of the bill, is thought to have been introduced as a joke and
a way of undermining the entire bill. At this time, some have argued that most of the members
of Congress did not want the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to empower the feminist movement.3
When the amendment was proposed, it was met by laughter from members of both parties and by
both those opposing and supporting the Civil Rights Act as a whole.4 Introducing this
amendment could have accomplished several things for the southern Democrats, who opposed

2

Kathleen Endres, In Their Own Voices: Women Redefine and Frame Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26
American Journalism 1, 59 (2009).
3
Cynthia Deitch, Gender, Race, and Class Politics and the Inclusion of Women in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 7 Gender and Society 2, 192 (1993).
4
Ibid., 192
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the Civil Rights Act. First, it may have divided the votes of those who supported the act by
providing protection for yet another group of people from discrimination, which many of the
Representatives did not want. Further, it would side-track the debate, and pull attention away
from the meaning of the bill as a whole, focusing specifically on the inclusion of sex. And lastly,
it would certainly place more pressure on the agency that was to be created, the EEOC, that
would be charged with the task of processing Title VII claims and enforcing the law.5 The
inclusion of sex would do this by creating many more claims that the EEOC would eventually
have to investigate, process, and attempt to resolve.

Some scholars suggest that the bill would not have passed without the efforts of lobbying
by groups within the Feminist Movement, namely the National Woman’s Party (“NWP”) and
other feminist congresswomen.6 Alice Paul, the leader of the NWP, was one of the biggest
proponents of the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII and the ERA.7 It was only after this lobbying
and much discussion in the House of Representatives that this amendment was even voted on.
Much of discussion was over whether women, in particular, needed protection under Title VII.
Some of the comments made during the discussions sounded much more like jokes than actual
consideration of the amendment. For example, when Smith introduced the amendment, he read a
letter that he had supposedly received from a woman that had complained that a “. . . numerical
‘imbalance of the sexes’ denied spinster women their ‘right to a nice husband and family’” and

5

Ibid., 186
Ibid., 185
7
Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservative, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 The Journal of Southern History 1, 37 (1983).
6
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asking that Congress protect that right and resolve the imbalance.8 Several of the lawmakers did
not find the inclusion of this amendment to the bill necessary, as many women would already be
included in the other protected classes. This, however, left out women that were not protected
under the other classes, to wit: white women. Further, the exclusion of sex would leave women
unprotected if they were treated differently from other employees due to their being female.

For several years prior to the introduction of the Civil Rights Act, there was an effort to
pass the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA” being introduced for the first time in 1923.) This
was a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would ensure that women could not be
discriminated against based on their gender. It was eventually passed by the U.S. Congress in
1972, but was never ratified by the requisite three-quarters of states within the time-limits in
order to become part of the Constitution. The gender amendment to Title VII was passed, in the
view of many, as an alternative to this amendment. Many law makers thought that the ERA
would be too far reaching, and settled for the gender amendment to Title VII.
The National Organization for Women (“NOW”) was one of the most influential forces
behind the enforcement Title VII. NOW is an organization that was created with the purpose of
furthering women’s role in society and was formed in 1966. The members of NOW were pivotal
to the Feminist Movement. Feminists such as Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan were influential
in the Feminist Movement, which was happening at the same time as the passing of Title VII.
Steinem is a famous journalist and activist and later became involved with NOW. Friedan

8

Deitch., at 191 (paraphrasing and quoting the Congressional Record)
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authored the book “The Feminine Mystique,” which is said to have sparked the second wave of
the Feminist Movement. Friedan was also the first president of NOW. Other women’s
organizations such as “Working Women United” (“WWU”) and the Alliance Against Sexual
Coercion (“AASC”) have, since the passing of Title VII, also been influential in shaping sexual
harassment litigation.9

THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

In beginning, the EEOC was created pursuant to Title VII as the federal agency charged
with processing and resolving claims of employment discrimination.10In order to file a claim of
sexual harassment, an individual must first file a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC will
investigate and attempt to resolve the claim. If it cannot resolve the claim, the complainant will
then be allowed to file an action in federal court. In 2011, the most recent year for which
statistics are available for, the EEOC and State Fair Employment Practices Agencies (“FEPAs,”)
the agencies around the country that process claims at a local level, enforcing local equal
employment opportunity laws which provide greater protections at a local level, and have a work
sharing agreement with the EEOC, received 11,364 charges against employers for sexual
harassment. Of those, 16.3% (approx. 1,852) of the charges were filed by males.11 12,571

9

Carol Kates, Working Class Feminism and Feminist Unions: Title VII, the UAW and NOW, Labor Studies Journal,
Summer, 28 (1989).
10
42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (1995) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
11
The reason for such a small percentage of the claims being filed by male victims could be the stigma that is
attached to a male claiming that he has been sexually harassed. Being sexually harassed is often not considered to
be “masculine.”
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charges were resolved in 2011, resulting in $52.3 million in monetary benefits.12 This data,
however, does not even include any benefits obtained through litigation.

12

Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997 - FY 2010, UNITED STATES EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (March 23, 2013),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment.cfm.

7

GENDER AND GENDER ATTTITUDES
Before one can fully understand gender attitudes, it is necessary to understand the
socially constructed idea of “gender.” Dr. Milton Diamond defines gender as “. . . society’s idea
of how boys or girls or men and women are expected to behave and should be treated.”13
Diamond goes on to illustrate that “. . . [a person] is a sex and [a person] does gender; that sex
typically, but not always, represents what is between one’s legs, whereas gender represents what
is between one’s ears.”14 Diamond’s example illustrates that gender is something that is created
by society. The author describes the concept of masculinity and femininity throughout the
article. He goes further to describe other gender identities, however, demonstrating that gender
is not strictly a dichotomous structure.

Gender attitudes are one of the underlying factors that affect how an individual perceives
workplace sexual harassment.15 Sexual harassment is often driven by a pursuit of power, rather
than sexual attraction.16 This is further fueled by sexism and sexual stereotypes. When
discussing gender attitudes, this paper will primarily focus on the concept of sexism.

13

Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender are Different: Sexual Identity and gender Identity are Different, 7 Clinical
Child Psychology and Psychiatry 3, 323 (2002).
14
Ibid., 323.
15
Richard L. Wiener, Roni Reiter-Palmon, Ryan J. Winter, Erin Richter, Amy Humke & Evelyn Mader,
Complainant Behavioral Tone, Ambivalent Sexism, and Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 16 Psychology, Public
Policy, And Law 56, 56-84 (2010).
16
Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassmen in the 1970s, 30 Feminist Studies 1, 7 (2004).
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TYPES OF SEXISM

Sexism, in one form or another, is present in the daily lives of most Americans. Peter
Glick and Susan Fiske state that sexism “has typically been conceptualized as a reflection of
hostility toward women.17 In their research, Glick and Fiske point out that, often times, sexism
can be “ambivalent” in nature.18 What the researchers mean by this is that there are two distinct
sets of sexist attitudes: hostile and benevolent.19 These two types of sexism, however, are often
found together and, thus, create “ambivalent” attitudes. The researchers have also found that
these attitudes are not exclusively directed toward women; they can be directed toward men as
well.20 A basic understanding of these different types of sexist attitudes is necessary in
understanding the background of this present research, as it examines, among other things, how
gender attitudes affect the amount of awards that a potential juror would award a male or female
victim of sexual harassment.

HOSTILE SEXISM

Hostile sexism is a term that needs little explanation. It is the type of sexism that most
people equate with “sexism” in general. This is a form of a patriarchal power construct. It is the

17

Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent
Sexism, 70 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, 491 (1996).
18
Ibid., 491.
19
Ibid., 491.
20
Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent
Beliefs About Men, 23 Psychology of Women Quarterly, 520 (1999).
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harmful attitudes that tend to be subjectively “negative”21 for the perceiver. These are the
attitudes which, traditionally, have been directed toward women and have made it more difficult
for them to gain employment, and more relevant to this research, have made them more
frequently the targets of sexual harassment in the workplace.22 Many of these attitudes are
characterized by perceiving one gender as “less favorable” than the other. An example of this
would be the view that women are too easily offended.

BENEVOLENT SEXISM
Glick and Fiske classify the other type of sexism “Benevolent.”23 This term is more
difficult to explain than Hostile Sexism. This type of sexism is characterized by attitudes that are
subjectively “positive” for the perceiver. These attitudes have been found to come from three
main sources: paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexuality.
Glick defines paternalism as relating to an individual “in the manner of a father dealing
with his children.”24 This definition speaks to the heart of the first source of benevolent sexism.
These attitudes are mainly about making the best decisions for the other gender, particularly

21

I place the term “negative” in quotes here because both forms of sexism are negative. However, the term
“negative” is a good fit here, because one of the main differences between the two types of sexism is that benevolent
sexism contains subjectively “positive” views one gender or the other. However, these subjectively “positive”
attitudes should also be considered to be “negative,” as they may act to the detriment of an individual. They act to
limit women’s opportunities in the workplace by breeding a set of stereotypes which can be difficult for a woman to
overcome.
22
Glick (1996) at 492.
23
Ibid., 493
24
Ibid., 493
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women. A good example of this type of attitude would be the belief that “[m]en should be
willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide financially for the women in their
lives.”25

Gender differentiation refers to the tendency of individuals to group themselves together
with those that share similar traits. For example, individuals of the same gender grouping
themselves together. This is used as a basis in all cultures for making social distinctions. There
are two subsets of gender differentiation: competitive and complimentary. In the case of
competitive gender differentiation, men tend to view women as subordinate to them. As Glick
phrases it, these attitudes tend to further the view that “[o]nly men are perceived as having the
traits necessary to govern important social institutions.”26

In the case of complimentary gender differentiation, men and women view each other as
completing each other and filling opposite roles within society. For instance, men working
outside of the home and women working within the home.

Heterosexuality, of course, refers to the sexual and romantic attractions between men and
women. This creates ambivalence in men’s attitudes toward women because, on the one hand,
they often depend on them for happiness (as a romantic relationship is ranked among the leading

25
26

Ibid., 512.
Ibid., 493.
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sources of happiness in life, see Berscheid & Peplau, 1983) and on the other hand resenting
women due to the vulnerability that this relationship creates.27

PERCEPTIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The EEOC has defined sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”28 Current research shows
that men and women perceive sexual harassment, in markedly different ways.29 Some scholars
assert that men are much more likely to be accepting of sexual harassment than women.30
Much of the current research supports the notion that sexual harassment training in the
workplace does raise awareness and ultimately lower workers’ tolerance of sexual harassment.
In other words, in the presence of a suitable sexual harassment training policy, workers are more
likely to recognize sexual harassment in the workplace and less likely to tolerate it. It also shows
that prolonged exposure to well-developed sexual harassment training in the workplace expands
the types of actions that individuals consider to be inappropriate and harassing. For example,
workers may now consider commenting on a woman’s attractiveness to be a form of harassment,
when before they did not.

27

Ibid., 494.
29 CFR §1604.11(a) (2001)
29
J. Mitchell Pickerill, Robert A. Jackson & Meredith A. Newman, Changing Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in
the Federal Workplace, 1987-94, 28 Law & Policy 3, 368-394 (2006).
30
Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training Change Attitudes? A View from the
Federal Level, 84 Social Science Quarterly 826, (2003).
28
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Individuals’ perceptions of a victim of sexual harassment can alter their perception of the
sexual harassment itself. For instance, a person would be less likely to find an “aggressive”
woman to be a victim of sexual harassment than a “timid” woman who has been subjected to the
same behavior. This has a lot to do with ambivalent sexism and traditional gender stereotypes of
“how women should behave.”31

31

Richard L. Wiener, Roni Reiter-Palmon, Ryan J. Winter, Erin Richter, Amy Humke & Evelyn Mader,
Complainant Behavioral Tone, Ambivalent Sexism, and Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 16 Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law 56, 56-84 (2010).
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DEVELOPMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE LAW

THE ENFORCEMENT OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson32 was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to address the
issue of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Through this decision the Court, although
it did not conclusively address all of the questions presented, provided guidance for the first time
on the issue of employer liability for a supervisor’s actions. Michelle Vinson (the victim of
harassment) was hired as a bank teller at Meritor Savings Bank. Shortly after being hired, her
supervisor, Sidney Taylor, began pressuring her to go on a date with him. After she agreed, he
began pressuring her for sexual favors. She ultimately gave into his requests, out of fear of
losing her job. The demands for sexual favors continued over the following months, rising to the
level of “fondling” her in front of other employees, and finally rising to forcible rape on multiple
occasions. She ultimately filed complaints against the employer through the EEOC, alleging a
violation of Title VII due to a hostile work environment caused by sexual harassment from
Taylor.
The Federal District Court ruled in the Meritor’s favor, granting summary judgment
because, according to the Federal District Court, Vinson failed to state a prima facie case of
sexual harassment. A prima facie case is the facts that must be proven for the Court to recognize
that there is potentially a Title VII claim of harassment. This includes showing that:

32

477 U.S. 57 (1986)
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(1) he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2)
that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”
(quoting Ellison at 875.)
Vinson then appealed the matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding
that Vinson sufficiently proved a prima facie case of sexual harassment.33 The United States
Supreme Court granted Meritor’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. A Petition for Writ of Certiorari
is the legal document that must be submitted to the United States Supreme Court that, in essence,
asks the Court to hear a particular case. This Petition must be granted in order for the Court to
issue a Writ of Certiorari, and accept the case. When the Supreme Court accepted to hear this
case, it was presented with two major issues: (1) Whether a claim of hostile work environment
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII and; (2) whether an
employer was absolutely liable any time a supervisor sexually harassed a subordinate.

On the first issue the Court held that hostile work environment sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII. This was a landmark decision because,
until Meritor, there was no guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court to the lower federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal on the issue of hostile work environment discrimination. Although the EEOC
Guidelines34 provided a framework for sexual harassment claims, there was not clarification
between the Circuit Courts of Appeal on its interpretation. The ruling in Meritor provided

33
34

Id., 62
29 CFR §1604
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guidance for the lower courts on the issue. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Rhenquist wrote that
“[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminates’ on the basis of sex.”35 However, Rhenquist’s
opinion limited an employer’s liability from strict liability to vicarious liability notice.36 This is
monumental because it means that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Court
goes further in its opinion, asserting that “. . .the language of Title VII is not limited to
‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women’ in employment.”37 [emphasis mine] It also wrote that “[t]he
EEOC Guidelines fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can
violate Title VII.”38 In other words, although the EEOC Guidelines, which are administrative
rules, are not controlling upon the courts, the Supreme Court in Meritor held that they should be
given some deference. Meritor is important, as it gives Title VII more discretion, so to speak,
than just being completely open to judicial interpretation.

The Court also determined that employer liability in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases is rooted in the law of agency. As such, it provides guidance to the lower
federal courts on employer liability. The Court provided an avenue through which employers
could be held liable for the harassing actions of supervisors, which until this point in time was an

35

At 64
Id., 73
37
At 64 quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707.
38
At 65.
36
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issue of debate among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. 39 The U.S. Supreme Court held
however, that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that the employer was almost always liable in
cases of supervisors harassing subordinates. In Meritor, however, the Court limited employer
liability stating that it should be rooted in agency principles. The Court will eventually create an
affirmative defense40 for employers, which will be discussed at length later in this thesis. An
affirmative defense is an argument which the employer may raise that would preclude it from
liability for the actions of supervisors.

SETTLING THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS BETWEEN COURTS
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., a Div. of Texas-American Petrochemicals, Inc.41 is a
Federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that held, in significant part, that claims of
hostile work environment sexual harassment are not actionable until the working environment
affects the psychological well-being of the victim. In this decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals took a more conservative approach toward Title VII claims than other circuits. The
Sixth Circuit Court, however, did state near the beginning of its decision that:

[t]his circuit has entertained cases involving a spectrum of sexual
harassment issues; however, it has not directly addressed a claim
asserting a violations of Title VII based upon an alleged sexually
discriminatory work environment which had not resulted in a

39

The conflict between the lower courts was about which standard to apply when reviewing the facts in a sexual
harassment case.
40
Established in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth
41
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)
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tangible job detriment as joined by the issues of the plaintiff’s
charges herein.42
In other words, this was the first time that the Sixth Circuit had addressed a claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment in which the purported victim had not been fired, demoted, or
otherwise adversely affected in his or her employment.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rabidue found that in order for a plaintiff to
successfully assert a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment he or she must prove
five things:

(1) the employee was a member of a protected class;
(2) the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment
in the form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;
(3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex;
(4) the charged sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably
interfering with the plaintiff’s work performance and creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that
affected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the
plaintiff; and
(5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.43 [emphasis
mine]

The Sixth Circuit Court made it difficult for a person alleging a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII to meet the standard. It was difficult because the language in Rabidue required
that the harassment cause psychological harm to the victim. This meant that the harassment had
to be more severe than in other Federal Circuits in order for it to be actionable under Title VII.

42
43

Id., at 619.
Id., at 619.
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The Sixth Circuit Court made it even more difficult for a victim of sexual harassment to
establish a claim with Judge Krupansky writing the following language:

It is of significance to note that instances of complained of sexual
conduct that prove equally offensive to male and female workers
would not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge because
both men and women were accorded like treatment.44
In other words, a victim must be treated differently from someone of the opposite sex in order to
state a claim. Using this language, a supervisor could hypothetically engage in inappropriate
touching with both male and female subordinates as long as the supervisor treated both of the
subordinates in a similar manner, there would arguably be no sexual harassment claim under
Title VII.

Another thing that Rabidue established was that instances of hostile work environment
sexual harassment had to be so severe that they would affect the psychological well-being of the
victim, in order for them to be actionable pursuant to Title VII. The Sixth Circuit Court wrote:

Thus, in the absence of conduct which would interfere with that
hypothetical reasonable individual’s work performance and affect
seriously the psychological well-being of that reasonable person
under like circumstances, a plaintiff may not prevail on asserted
charges of sexual harassment anchored in an alleged hostile and/or
abusive work environment regardless of whether the plaintiff was
actually offended by the defendant’s conduct.45
In addition to the above standard, the Sixth Circuit also embraced the “reasonable
person” standard for examining sexual harassment. The standard examines the actions of the

44
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Id., at 620
Id., at 620.
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harasser through the eyes of a gender neutral “reasonable person” in order to determine if his or
her actions should be considered sexual harassment as defined by Title VII.
In contrast to the standard set forth in the Sixth Circuit, Ellison v. Brady46 was a Federal
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case addressed whether the “Reasonable Person” or “Reasonable
Woman” should be employed to evaluate when a supervisor’s behavior should be considered
harassing. The Court of Appeals held that the more gender-focused of the two standards, the
“Reasonable Woman” standard, should be employed in determining whether the acts of a
supervisor should be considered to be harassing. The Court of Appeals provided the following
example as part of their reason for choosing the more gender-focused of the two standards:

For example, because women are disproportionately victims of
rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be
concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild
forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a
harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.47

By this, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is pointing out the fact that a “reasonable woman”
may perceive the actions of a harasser differently than a “reasonable man.” The opinion aims to
make the evaluation more tightly focused on the victim, looking at the subjective intent of the
harasser. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also writes that the “Reasonable Person” standard,
which had previously been employed until the decision of the case, favored a male-bias, making
it more difficult for female victims to state her case.

46
47

924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
At 879
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Another issue in Ellison is to what level the severity of harassment must rise in order for
it to be actionable under Title VII. Some courts, such as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, had
suggested that the harassment must be so severe as to nearly cause the victim psychological harm
in order for it to be considered actionable. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addresses the issue by writing the following:
It is the harasser’s conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not
the alterations in the conditions of employment. Surely,
employees need not endure sexual harassment until their
psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that
they suffer anxiety and debilitation.48

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asserted the idea that the conduct must be severe and/or
pervasive, but that the victim need not suffer actual psychological harm. In other words, if the
victim reasonably perceives the conduct to be harassing, then the injury or harm to the victim has
been established.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.49 was the next landmark United States Supreme Court
decision in the area of hostile work environment sexual harassment litigation. The opinion,
written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor50, clarified the standard set forth in Meritor. The
United States Supreme Court further refined what actions may constitute sexual harassment, as
well as resolved a major conflict between the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal as to
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Id., At 878
510 U.S. 17 (1993)
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Sandra Day O’Connor was the first female justice of the United States Supreme Court.
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whether psychological injury must be present as a result of the sexual harassment in order for it
to be actionable under Title VII.

One of the first things the United States Supreme Court did in its opinion was reaffirm
the ruling set forth in Meritor. Justice O’Connor reiterated the fact that discrimination claims are
not limited to “economic” or “tangible” job benefits. Rather, the injury of sexual harassment
may also include “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” O’Connor points out that the
congressional intent was to not require any person to work in a discriminatorily hostile
environment.
In her majority opinion, O’Connor writes that:

[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment – an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive – is beyond
Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and
there is no Title VII violation.

In other words, a “reasonable person” must perceive that the harassing conduct had the effect of
altering working conditions in order for the harassment to be actionable. The United States
Supreme Court ultimately reaffirmed its decision in Meritor, while adding the “reasonable
person” standard, and clarifying the fact that the conduct must be subjectively perceived by the
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victim to be abusive. However, the Supreme Court does warn though, that “. . . Title VII comes
into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”51

EMPLOYER LIABILITY
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth52 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton53 the
United States Supreme Court provided meaningful guidance on the issue of employer liability
for cases in which the harasser is a supervisor or has authority or power over the subordinate.
The Supreme Court established an affirmative defense for employers that may be raised in a
sexual harassment case. The employer’s affirmative defense consists of two prongs: 1) the
employer must prove that it has implemented and enforced an adequate workplace sexual
harassment policy and 2) the employer must prove that the purported victim of sexual
harassment failed to make use of the sexual harassment policy. In other words, if the employer
can prove that they had an intra-office system to address sexual harassment claims and that the
complainant did not utilize the system, the employer will not be held liable for sexual
harassment. The defense, however, may only be raised in cases where there is no tangible
adverse employment action. An example of this could be an unpleasant or uncomfortable
working environment. Up until this point, many employers argued that a supervisor/harasser
was acting “outside the scope of the agency relationship” in order to avoid liability. The
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argument, however, did not always prevail for employers. Courts might hold employers liable
for the harassing behavior of supervisors, whether or not they could have or should have known
that the harassment was taking place.54 Clearly, neither of the “solutions” adequately addressed
the problem of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors. For this reason the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is important. It provides a way for employers to avoid
liability for sexual harassment if they institute and utilize a system of reporting sexual
harassment and addressing it internally.

Although the United States Supreme Court expanded on the standards by which lower
courts should examine sexual harassment charges in Faragher , it also admonished that “[a]
recurring point in these opinions is that ‘simple teasing’ [citation omitted], offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in
the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”55 The statement instructs lower courts to examine
each case of alleged harassment independently, but also to take into account that there is a level
to which harassing actions by a supervisor must rise before the behavior of the supervisor can be
considered “harassment,” within the purview of the Supreme Court.

54

e.g., the Court of Appeals in Meritor found an employer to be strictly liable for the harassing
behavior of a supervisor because the supervisor “. . . is necessarily an ‘agent’ of his employer for
all Title VII purposes, since ‘even the appearance’ of such authority may enable him to impose
himself on his subordinates” id., at 70. The Supreme Court limited an employer’s liability by
directing lower courts to examine and apply agency principles.
55
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The Supreme Court continues in its opinion to comment on the position of supervisors,
and to expand upon the principle set forth in Meritor that lower courts should look to the law of
agency when addressing employer liability. The Supreme Court in Faragher writes that

. . . supervisors have special authority enhancing their capacity to
harass, and that the employer can guard against their misbehavior
more easily because their numbers are by definition fewer than the
numbers of regular employees.56
Justice David Souter writes further that “[t]he agency relationship affords contact with an
employee subjected to a supervisor’s sexual harassment, and the victim may well be reluctant to
accept the risks of blowing the whistle on a superior.”57 When addressing the issue of employer
liability, the Supreme Court in Faragher and Burlington reiterate throughout its opinions that
lower courts must look to agency principles in order to properly review the actions of
supervisors. Before this, many employers in similar cases might argue that the supervisor was
acting “outside the scope of his or her employment.” The argument is no longer a valid defense,
as the Supreme Court has held that harassing supervisors are aided in their actions by the agency
relationship, potentially making the employer liable for their actions.58
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SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.59 the Supreme Court was first faced with
the question of whether sexual harassment between members of the same sex was actionable
under Title VII. The question came to the Supreme Court because there was conflict among the
lower courts. Some lower courts held that same-sex sexual harassment claims were never
actionable under Title VII because they did not fit within the original intent of Congress in
passing Title VII.60 Others found that claims are actionable only if the plaintiff could prove that
the harasser was a homosexual.61 Still others found that harassment that is sexual in context is
always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s gender.62 The Supreme Court resolved the
question for lower courts. Here the Supreme Court held that workplace sexual harassment is
actionable if it is motivated by sex, regardless of the harasser’s sex. The Supreme Court’s
opinion gives a good example of how harassment must be interpreted by the context of the
situation. Consider one of the more conservative leaning members of the Court, Justice Antonin
Scalia, wrote for the majority:

. . . that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context
in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its
target. A professional football player’s working environment is
not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach
smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field – even if the
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same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the
coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of
the words used or the physical acts performed.63
The overall theme of the case, however, may be better characterized by Justice Clarence
Thomas’s concurring opinion, in which he writes “. . .the [Supreme] Court stresses that in every
sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII’s statutory
requirement that there be discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”64

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders65 the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time,
the issue of a “constructive discharge” in a hostile work environment sexual harassment case.
Constructive discharge is a concept that the Supreme Court has defined as creating working
conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to resign.66 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg wrote “[w]e agree with the lower courts and the EEOC that Title VII encompasses
employer liability for a constructive discharge.”67
The Supreme Court held in Suders that constructive discharge could be considered a
“tangible employment action” for the purposes of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The
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Supreme Court instructs lower courts to interpret this issue on a case-by-case basis, however, by
stating that the affirmative defense could be available in some cases of constructive discharge.

MIXED-MOTIVE SEX DISCRIMINATION
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins68 was the first United States Supreme Court case to address
the issue of mixed-motive sex discrimination and disparate impact. Mixed-motive discrimination
occurs when an employer makes an adverse employment action relying on a discriminatory
reason as well as a “legitimate” reason. The Court held that if the employer can prove that it
would have made the adverse decision regardless of the discriminatory gender factor, that the
employer may not be a violation of Title VII. If, however, the employer cannot prove that the
action would have happened regardless, it is actionable.
The Supreme Court wrote that “[w]e take these words to mean that gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand
for ‘but-for causation,’ as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them.”69 Justice William
Brennan writes that:
[e]ach time, we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that
an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse
employment decision has thereby place upon the defendant the
burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the
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490 U.S. 228 (1989)
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absence of the unlawful motive. Our decision today treads this
well-worn path.70
The Supreme Court, in other words, requires that an employer that makes an adverse
employment decision for mixed-motive reasons must be able to prove that it would have made
the same decision absent a discriminatory motive in order to avoid liability.
In the case of Price Waterhouse, for instance, the complainant, Anne Hopkins was denied
a promotion due, in part, to the fact that she was determined to be “too aggressive” for a woman
and that she did not conform to gender-stereotypes. The employer also relied on some
“legitimate” reasons, thus creating “mixed-motives.” The Supreme Court goes further to hold
that “[a]n employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a
legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the
decision.”71
This type of a dynamic in hiring and promotion practices creates a very difficult
environment for women or men to advance in their careers due to gender stereotyping. The
Supreme Court illustrates this ides by stating that: “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness
in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”72
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DAMAGES IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association73 the Supreme Court examines the issue of
when punitive damages may be assessed against an employer in a Title VII violation based on
sex. The Supreme Court rejects the previously held view of many lower courts that punitive
damages can only be assessed in cases based upon the employer’s egregious conduct. The
Supreme Court further holds that lower courts should look instead toward the actor’s subjective
state of mind in evaluating the possibility for punitive damages. The Supreme Court writes that:
“[t]he conduct committed with the specified mental state may be characterized as egregious,
however, is not to say that employers must engage in conduct with some independent,
‘egregious’ quality before being subject to a punitive award.”74 Justice O’Connor uses an
example to explain the previous language as follows:

On this view, even an employer who makes every effort to comply
with Title VII would be held liable for the discriminatory acts of
agents acting in a ‘managerial capacity.’
Holding employers liable for punitive damages when they engage
in good faith efforts to comply with Titlve VII, however, is in
some tension with the very principles underlying common law
limitations on vicarious liability for punitive damages – that it is
‘improper ordinarily to award punitive damages against one who
himself is personally innocent and therefore liable only
vicariously.’75
The Supreme Court in Kolstadt ultimately finds that an employer’s conduct does not need
to be independently “egregious” in order for a lower court to award punitive damages. The
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lower courts may award punitive damages against an employer solely for the actions of a
supervisor if the actions rise to a certain level.76 The actions must be “egregious” in order to
illicit an award of punitive damages.

76

Id., at 545
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GENDER AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT

DEVELOPING THE SURVEY
Gender and Workplace Sexual Harassment (“Survey”) was developed by Anthony
Ferraro and this writer in order to assess how a potential juror’s gender attitudes, attitudes toward
sexual harassment, and the gender of a victim of sexual harassment in a hypothetical sexual
harassment scenario affected award amounts. The survey was developed by combining two
previously published scales to measure gender attitudes77 and another previously published scale
used to measure sexual harassment attitudes78. Ferraro and I also developed a hypothetical
sexual harassment scenario that interchanged the sex of the actors (“Social Scenario Rating.”)
The Survey also contained a demographic section that included gender and age, among several
other categories. The Survey was completed by 268 participants. Of which, about half received
a version of the Social Scenario Rating with a male victim of sexual harassment from a female
supervisor and the other half received a version with a female victim and a male supervisor.
Other than the “gender switch” the Social Scenario Rating was identical.

77
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Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory
Sexual Harassment Attitudes Scale
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EXPECTED RESULTS

The expected results at the outset of the research was that potential jurors, especially
jurors with higher levels of sexism, as determined by the first three scales, would be more likely
to award damages to a female victim rather than a male victim due to the presence of
paternalistic “protectionist views” of women that would typically act in favor of female victims.

DISTRIBUTION

The Survey was hosted on Surveygizmo.com and distributed mainly via social media.
The survey was also distributed to students in several classes at the University of Central Florida
via e-mail.

METHOD OF INTERPRETING DATA

The responses to various sections of the survey were coded as follows:
The responses on the ASI, AMI, and SHAS were averaged (as per their “grading”
instructions) and interpreted based upon the authors’ instructions. For these portions of the
survey, participants were provided with a 6 point likert-scale (0-5). A higher average on the ASI
and AMI indicated that the participant had a higher level of “ambivalent” sexism present in his
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or her gender attitudes. A higher average on the SHAS indicated that the participant was more
tolerant and accepting of sexual harassment in the workplace.
The “version” of the survey that was given to each participant was classified as either “1”
if the participant received the version with a female victim and a male supervisor and “2” if the
version contained a male victim and female subordinate.

The responses to each question following the Social Scenario Rating were graded
individually and converted to a “dummy variable”79 of either “0” if they favored the victim and a
“1” if the response did not favor the victim. The answers were construed to either favor the
victim or not favor the victim as follows:
67. “Is [victim]’s claim valid?” – an answer of “yes” was construed to favor the victim
and an answer of “no” was construed not to favor the victim.
68. “Should [harasser] be liable for [victim]’s claim?” – an answer of “yes” was
construed to favor the victim and an answer of “no” was construed not to favor the victim.
69. “Should Fullwillow Credit Union be liable for [victim]’s claim?” – an answer of
“yes” was construed to favor the victim and an answer of “no” was construed not to favor the
victim.

79

The participants offered answers based on a six-point likert scale, which was then converted into a “dichotomous”
response of either “favors victim” or “does not favor victim.”
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70. “Should [victim] be awarded back pay of $51,600 for wages and benefits lost since
[his/her] firing?” – an answer of “yes” was construed to favor the victim and an answer of “no”
was construed as not to favor the victim.
71. “How much should [victim] be compensated for any actual psychological damage or
emotional distress [he/she] may have suffered?” – an answer of “$87,500,” “$350,000,”
“$1,400,000,” or “all of these amounts are too low” was construed to favor the victim while an
answer of “all of these amounts are too high” or “[victim] should not be awarded damages for
psychological damage or emotional distress” were construed not to favor the victim.
72. “How much should [victim] be awarded in punitive damages from [harasser] (award
amount used to punish the offender)?” – an answer of “$37,000,” “$150,000,” “$600,000,” or
“all of these amounts are too low” was construed to favor the victim while an answer of “all of
these amounts are too high” or “[victim] should not be awarded punitive damages from
[harasser]” was construed not to favor the victim.
73. “How much should [victim] be awarded in punitive damages from the credit union
(award amount used to punish the offender)?” – an answer of “$581,250,” “$2,325,000,”
“$9,300,000,” or “all of these amounts are too low” was construed to favor the victim while an
answer of “all of these amounts are too high” or “[victim] should not be awarded punitive
damages from the credit union” were construed not to favor the victim.
An answer of “yes” to questions 67-69 were construed as favoring the victim because
they established a participant’s belief that the victim in the Social Scenario Rating had a valid
35

claim of sexual harassment, and that either the harasser or the employer should be held liable for
it. An answer of “no” on these questions did not establish that the participants held such views.
An answer of “yes” on question 70 was construed as favoring the victim because it
awards compensatory damages, to wit: back-pay. This demonstrates that the participant
believed that the victim was entitled to at least some form of redress. An answer of “no” does
not favor the victim because it fails to establish this view.

For questions 71-73, an answer that awarded the victim any amount of money, or stated
that “all of these amounts are too low,” was classified as favoring the victim, while a response
providing for no awards or that “all of these amounts are too high” was construed as not favoring
the victim. This is because in the former case, the participant was willing to either assign an
award amount to the victim, or provide for a higher award amount than was listed by the authors,
demonstrating that they believed that the victim was entitled to some substantial amount of
awards. In the latter case, however, the participants either did not believe that an award was
appropriate, or believed that all of the award amounts listed by the authors were in excess. This
shows that those participants would be more reluctant to provide any monetary relief to the
victim in the Social Scenario Rating.
The sex of the participant was classified as “0” if he was a male or “1” if she was a
female.
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The age of the participant was classified as “0” if he or she was not yet an adult when the
decision in Meritor (the first landmark sexual harassment case) was decided and a “1” if he or
she was an adult when the opinion was issued.80

The coded data was then run through SPSS and analyzed via Principal Component
Analysis, Inter-item Correlations, and T-tests. These tests were used because they were the best
means to analyze the available data.

RESULTS
Appendices A through F show the statistical analysis of the survey responses as follows:
Appendix A demonstrates that the responses to the Social Scenario Rating questions were
significantly related. The participants’ responses as to whether the victim had a claim of sexual
harassment related to the issue of supervisor liability with a correlation of .722, the issue of
employer liability with a correlation of .722, the issue of whether he or she is entitle to back pay
with a correlation of .796, and with the amount of punitive damages that should be assessed to
the supervisor with a correlation of .582. The issue of the supervisor’s liability related to the
issue of back pay with a correlation of .688 and the issue of whether punitive damages should be
assessed against the supervisor with a correlation of .619. The issue of employer liability had
similar results, with a correlation of .741 to back pay, and .511 to punitive damages assessed
against the employer. The question of back pay related to the issue of assessing punitive
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This classification appears to be irrelevant to the present research, as there were not enough participants that were
adults when Meritor was decided to provide any meaningful analysis, although these statistics were analyzed
alongside the present data. This will, therefore, not be discussed at length.
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damages against the supervisor with a correlation of .610. Whether the victim should be
awarded damages for psychological and emotional damages related to the issue of punitive
damages against the supervisor with a correlation of .600 and to the issue of punitive damages
against the employer with a correlation of .586. What the data suggests is that a participant is
likely to either favor the victim in most of these responses (or not favor the victim), but that that
the responses appear to be inter-related. It is not merely random.
Appendix B further breaks down the responses, illustrating only the correlations between
the first four questions of the Social Scenario Rating encompassing whether the victim has a
claim and whether the supervisor or employer should be held liable.
Appendix C illustrates a surprising interpretation of the statistics. The participants were
more likely to favor the victim in the version with a male victim than they were in the version
with a female victim. For every single question of the Social Scenario Rating , the mean answer
is lower for the responses on version 2, indicating a higher tendency to favor the victim in
version 2 (male victim). The results were as follows:
As to question number 67, addressing whether the victim has a claim of sexual
harassment, the mean score for the version with a female victim was .74, while the mean score
for the version including a male victim was .64. This shows that participants were more willing
(by a mean score of .10) to consider a claim by a male victim to be valid.
As to question number 68, addressing whether the supervisor should be held liable, the
mean score for a female victim was .78, while the mean score for a male victim was .69. Once
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again, this favors the male victim by .09, indicating a tendency to find valid a claim of sexual
harassment by a male victim.
As to question number 69, addressing whether the employer should be held liable, the
mean score for a female victim was .79, while it was .71 for a male victim. This continues to
illustrate the trend that participants were more likely to favor the male victim, in this case, by a
margin of .08.
As to question number 70, addressing whether the victim is entitled to back pay, the
mean score for a female victim was .78, while the mean score for a male victim was .70. Once
again illustrating the same principle listed above.
As to question number 71, addressing how much, if anything at all, the victim should
receive as compensation for psychological and emotional harm, the mean score for female
victims was .89, while it was .88 in the case of a male victim. This is a much smaller margin
than the others, but still follows the same trend that participants are more likely to award
damages to male victims.
As for question number 72, addressing how much, if anything at all, the victim should
receive in punitive damages against the supervisor, the mean score for female victims was .85,
while the mean score for male victims was .79, once again, continuing the trend.
As for the last question, number 73, addressing how much, if anything at all, the victim
should receive in punitive damages against the employer, the mean score for female victims was
.92 and the mean score for male victims was .83, a difference of .09.
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These results, in particular, are provide important implications to the current research
because they should that there is a clear difference between a participant’s tendency to find
liability and award damages in the case of a female victim and in the case of a male victim. This
goes to the crux of the main question asked at the outset of this research, to wit: whether the
gender a victim of sexual harassment plays a role in the award amounts that would be offered by
a jury.
Appendix D demonstrates that there is a high level of significance (lower than .05) for all
of the questions except the one concerning damages for psychological and emotional suffering.
This suggests that all of these questions, with the exception of that one, provide meaningful data
as to the validity of the correlations between the responses to the Social Scenario Rating
questions with regard to which version of the Social Scenario Rating the participant received.
This further cements the notion that whether it is a male being harassed by a female supervisor or
vice-versa does have a significant effect on the responses provided.
Appendix E illustrates that male and female participants were close in their responses as
to whether they favored the victim or not. The most notable statistic from this table is that male
participants were significantly more likely to favor the victim, regardless of the victim’s sex, on
the issue of assessing punitive damages against the employer.
Appendix F demonstrates that the participants’ responses on the ASI, AMI, and SHAS
are all significantly related. It also shows that the responses on all of the questions of the Social
Scenario Rating are also significantly related. It is notable that the responses on the ASI are
significantly related to the responses to employer liability and back pay compensation.
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LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
The largest limitation of this study was the fact that the responses to the Social Scenario
Rating were converted to a “dichotomous” response, rather than left as a scale. This is due, in
part, to the fact that half of the Social Scenario Rating questions utilized a “dichotomous”
nominal response, while the other half were framed using a scale response. The responses must
be uniform in order to keep the results for this section completely comparable. Thus, the
conversion to all “dichotomous” responses. Using the “dichotomous” responses rather than the
scale has not hindered the results, though a more in-depth analysis could be conducted if the
responses were to remain in their original form. The data that has been generated as a result of
this research is certainly useful, and could be analyzed and interpreted far beyond what has been
done in the present setting. With a much more in-depth analysis of the data one may be able to
draw many more relevant conclusions.
Another way that the research could benefit is from more responses. Due to the time
constraints of the research, I was able to gather 268 usable responses. Although this was a large
enough sample to produce significant data, more relevant conclusions could be drawn from
continued distribution and a larger, and possibly more diverse, sample size.

IMPLICATION OF RESULTS
The most important implication that these results shows is that there is a marked
difference between participants’ responses with respect to the gender of the victim of harassment
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in the social scenario. The data suggests that participants were more likely to favor a male
victim than a female victim.
It is also important to note that the responses to the Social Scenario Rating questions are
significantly related to each other. The significance provides support for any conclusions drawn
from the analysis of the data, as the responses are clearly not just random answers to the
questions presented in the survey; each response has definite meaning and carries weight as far
as the research is concerned.
Another important implication that can be drawn is that participants were more likely not
to favor the victim in the presented social scenario. The data may illustrate the struggle that any
victim of hostile work environment sexual harassment might face in pursuing his or her claim in
a jury trial, even after facing the hurdles that are imposed by requiring the complaint to first be
processed by the EEOC.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, when looking at the development of sexual harassment law through the
lens of gender attitudes and attitudes about sexual harassment, one can see that much progress
has been made since the passing of Title VII and the inclusion of “sex” as a protected class.
After the passing of Title VII and the Supreme Court decisions discussed Supra, women have an
avenue for legal redress when they do experience disparate treatment or disparate impact in
employment. The Supreme Court decisions, however, have created more requirements for a
claim of sexual harassment to even be heard in the Court. The complainant must first prove a
prima facie case and then the employer has the opportunity to raise the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense. It seems as if the Supreme Court is encouraging employers to attempt to
police themselves for compliance with Title VII.
The survey results are of particular interest, as they show a bias toward male victims.
This could demonstrate that the participants were more willing to attribute blame to the female
victim for the fact that she was harassed than they were to male victim.
Developments in equal rights laws continue to happen even today. During his last term,
President Barack Obama signed into law the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which provides an
avenue for women to pursue Equal Pay Act claims. The Supreme Court is also expected to hand
down a ruling on the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. These are both pivotal
issues in today’s society, and they both have implications for future developments in the
continuing Civil Rights movements.
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Although some progress has been made, many limitations on a victim of sexual
harassment’s rights have been put in place. There is much more work to be done. Women, as a
class, still do not make the same income as men do, and there are far fewer management
opportunities for women than for men. 81 The only way to correct this is with a forward-thinking
generation that is willing and ready to address and correct the wrongs and inequalities that have
been put into place by past generations.

81

Laura Fitzpatrick, Why do Women Still Earn Less than Men?, Time (April 20, 2010)
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

PECOMP

SPDAMAGE

EPDAMAGE

VCLAIM

1.000

.722

.722

.796

.489

.582

.450

SLIABLE

.722

1.000

.508

.688

.475

.619

.331

ELIABLE

.722

.508

1.000

.741

.443

.420

.511

BPCOMP

.796

.688

.741

1.000

.459

.610

.499

PECOMP

.489

.475

.443

.459

1.000

.600

.586

SPDAMAGE

.582

.619

.420

.610

.600

1.000

.526

EPDAMAGE
Table 1

.450

.331

.511

.499

.586

.526

1.000
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

VCLAIM

1.000

.722

.722

.796

SLIABLE

.722

1.000

.508

.688

ELIABLE

.722

.508

1.000

.741

BPCOMP
Table 2

.796

.688

.741

1.000
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Group Statistics
Version

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Version 1

144

.74

.442

.037

Version 2

124

.64

.483

.043

Version 1

144

.78

.417

.035

Version 2

124

.69

.463

.042

Version 1

144

.79

.408

.034

Version 2

124

.71

.456

.041

Version 1

144

.78

.412

.034

Version 2

124

.70

.459

.041

Version 1

144

.89

.315

.026

Version 2

124

.88

.327

.029

Version 1

144

.85

.354

.030

Version 2

124

.79

.409

.037

Version 1

144

.92

.267

.022

Version 2

124

.83

.377

.034

VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

PECOMP

SPDAMAGE

EPDAMAGE
Table 3
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test

t-test for Equality of Means

for Equality of
Variances
F

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean Difference

Std. Error Difference

tailed)

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Equal variances assumed

11.534

.001

Upper

1.751

266

.081

.099

.057

-.012

.210

1.740

251.871

.083

.099

.057

-.013

.211

1.566

266

.118

.084

.054

-.022

.190

1.554

250.029

.121

.084

.054

-.022

.191

1.555

266

.121

.082

.053

-.022

.186

1.542

249.111

.124

.082

.053

-.023

.187

1.560

266

.120

.083

.053

-.022

.188

1.548

249.580

.123

.083

.054

-.023

.189

.251

266

.802

.010

.039

-.068

.087

.250

256.966

.803

.010

.039

-.068

.088

1.370

266

.172

.064

.047

-.028

.156

1.356

245.278

.176

.064

.047

-.029

.157

2.356

266

.019

.093

.039

.015

.171

2.298

217.239

.023

.093

.040

.013

.173

VCLAIM
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

9.606

.002

SLIABLE
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

9.525

.002

ELIABLE
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

9.564

.002

BPCOMP
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

.251

.617

PECOMP
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

7.535

.006

SPDAMAGE
Equal variances not assumed
Equal variances assumed

23.361

.000

EPDAMAGE
Equal variances not assumed
Table 4

52

APPENDIX E: SPSS Analysis Part 5

53

Group Statistics
Gender

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Male

109

.67

.472

.045

Female

159

.70

.458

.036

Male

109

.73

.444

.043

Female

159

.74

.439

.035

Male

109

.76

.428

.041

Female

159

.75

.435

.035

Male

109

.74

.439

.042

Female

159

.75

.435

.035

Male

109

.87

.336

.032

Female

159

.89

.310

.025

Male

109

.82

.389

.037

Female

159

.83

.377

.030

Male

109

.84

.364

.035

Female

159

.91

.293

.023

VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

PECOMP

SPDAMAGE

EPDAMAGE
Table 5
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Correlations

ASI
Pearson Correlation
ASI

Pearson Correlation

VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

268
.750

**

SHAS

VCLAIM

SLIABLE

ELIABLE

BPCOMP

PECOMP

SPDAMAGE

EPDAMAGE

.750**

.670**

.098

.038

.126*

.121*

.110

.048

.016

.000

.000

.108

.540

.039

.048

.071

.431

.790

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

1

**

.029

-.021

.056

.031

.000

-.073

-.003

.000

.636

.729

.364

.619

.995

.234

.961

.558

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

**

**

1

.025

.009

.040

.021

.042

-.027

-.018

.685

.883

.513

.730

.496

.655

.774

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

1

**

**

**

**

**

.450**

Pearson Correlation
SHAS

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AMI

AMI

.670

.558

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

268

268

268

Pearson Correlation

.098

.029

.025

Sig. (2-tailed)

.108

.636

.685

N

268

268

268

268
**

.722

.722

.722

.000

.000

.000

.000

268

268

268

268

268

268

1

**

**

**

**

.331**

-.021

.009

Sig. (2-tailed)

.540

.729

.883

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

**

**

.508

.000

.000

268

268

268

268

268

1

**

**

**

.511**

.056

.040

Sig. (2-tailed)

.039

.364

.513

.000

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

**

**

**

.741

.000

.000

268

268

268

268

1

**

**

.499**

.000

.000

.000

268

268

268

1

**

.586**

.000

.000

.121

.031

.021

Sig. (2-tailed)

.048

.619

.730

.000

.000

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

**

**

**

**

.000

.042

Sig. (2-tailed)

.071

.995

.496

.489

.475

.443

.420

.000

Pearson Correlation

.741

.443

.000

*

.110

.619

.000

.126

.688

.475

.000

Pearson Correlation

.508

.688

.000

*

Pearson Correlation

.582

.000

.038

.796

.489

.000

Pearson Correlation

.722

.796

.459

.459

.610

.600

PECOMP
.000
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.000

.000

.000

SPDAMAGE

EPDAMAGE

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

Pearson Correlation

.048

-.073

-.027

.582**

.619**

.420**

.610**

.600**

1

.526**

Sig. (2-tailed)

.431

.234

.655

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

**

**

**

**

**

**

1

.450

Pearson Correlation

.016

-.003

-.018

Sig. (2-tailed)

.790

.961

.774

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

N

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

268

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 6
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.331

.511

.499

.586

.000

.526
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63
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65

66
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